# Security in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Canonical page: https://closeprotectionhire.com/cities/ouagadougou/

Security context for Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, under active jihadist insurgency and military governance. Risk assessment for organisations monitoring the situation.


## Threats

- **Active Jihadist Insurgency**: Burkina Faso has been affected by jihadist insurgency since 2015, with Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province conducting attacks across the country. Ouagadougou itself has experienced multiple terrorist attacks, including the 2016 Splendid Hotel attack (killing approximately 30 people) and a 2018 attack on the French embassy and the general staff headquarters. The FCDO advises against all travel to Burkina Faso, including Ouagadougou. Source: FCDO Burkina Faso travel advice (2026).
- **Military Governance**: Burkina Faso experienced two military coups in 2022: Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba overthrew elected President Roch Kabore in January 2022, and Captain Ibrahim Traore overthrew Damiba in October 2022. Captain Traore leads the military junta (MPSR) which governs the country. The political and security situation under military governance is significantly less predictable for international personnel than under an elected civilian government.
- **Displacement and Humanitarian Crisis**: The jihadist insurgency has caused one of West Africa's largest displacement crises, with more than 2 million internally displaced persons as of 2024 per UNHCR. Large parts of the north, east, and Sahel regions of Burkina Faso are effectively inaccessible or under jihadist group control. Humanitarian access is severely constrained.
- **Terrorism Risk Within Ouagadougou**: Locations frequented by international visitors including hotels, restaurants, and international organisations have been targeted in previous attacks. The threat of further attacks in Ouagadougou cannot be excluded. The US State Department classifies Burkina Faso at Level 4 (Do Not Travel) as of 2026. Source: US State Dept Burkina Faso travel advisory (2026).

## Regulations

- **Licensing**: Private security in Burkina Faso is regulated by Décret 2021-1243 regulating the activities of private security companies, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 27 October 2021 on the report of the Ministry of Security. It follows Décret 2009-343 on private guarding companies. Under the 2009 decree, companies needed prior authorisation from the minister responsible for security, valid for 5 years and renewable, after a police background check. The 2021 decree's text could not be read on 22 October 2026, so ask any provider for its current Ministry of Security authorisation.
- **Firearms**: The 2009 guarding decree let private security companies carry civilian weapons, handguns of up to 7.65 mm, for use in self-defence only, and civilian arms are governed by Décret 2009-301 of 8 May 2009 (DCAF study, 2022). Whether Décret 2021-1243 keeps that rule could not be confirmed, because the copy published by the police academy is a scanned image. Confirm any armed element, and the authority behind it, in writing before an assignment starts.
- **Foreign operators**: Under the 2009 decree, a foreign national could not manage or direct a private security company in Burkina Faso, and the decree made no provision for international security companies to operate there (DCAF study, 2022). Whether the 2021 decree keeps these rules could not be confirmed. Work through a Burkinabe company holding a Ministry of Security authorisation, and take local legal advice before a foreign team carries out protective duties.

Sources, checked 2026-10-22:

- [Académie de Police du Burkina Faso, private security downloads: Décret 2021-1243 portant réglementation des activités des sociétés privées de sécurité au Burkina Faso, and Décret 2009-343](https://academiedepolice.bf/index.php/telechargement/category/37-securite-privee)
- [Council of Ministers report of 27 October 2021 (copy on Benin Web TV): decree regulating private security companies, Ministry of Security](https://beninwebtv.bj/burkina-faso-compte-rendu-du-conseil-des-ministres-de-ce-mercredi-27-octobre-2021/)
- [Private Security Observatory (DCAF), Etude de référence sur le secteur de la sécurité privée au Burkina Faso (2022), pages 12 and 36 to 39](https://www.privatesecurityobservatory.org/media/pdf/baseline-studies/2022-burkina-faso_fr.pdf)

## Zones

Lower-risk areas:

- No area of Ouagadougou can be treated as safe given the active insurgency and history of terrorist attacks in the capital.

Elevated-risk areas:

- All of Ouagadougou: active terrorist threat including attacks on international locations.
- All areas outside Ouagadougou: jihadist group control of significant territories; armed robbery on road approaches.

## Emergency contacts

- Police: 17
- Fire service: 18
- SAMU (medical emergency): 112
- CHU Yalgado Ouedraogo (main hospital): +226 25 30 66 44

## Warnings

- The FCDO advises against all travel to Burkina Faso, including Ouagadougou. The country is experiencing active jihadist insurgency with documented terrorist attacks in the capital. Source: FCDO Burkina Faso travel advice (2026).
- The US State Department classifies Burkina Faso at Level 4 (Do Not Travel) as of 2026. Source: US State Dept Burkina Faso travel advisory (2026).
- Ouagadougou International Airport (OUA) has been the subject of security concerns given the terrorist threat in the capital. Pre-arrange essential transfers and do not use informal transport.
- Medical facilities in Ouagadougou, including CHU Yalgado Ouedraogo, are below international standards and may be overwhelmed in a mass casualty event. Medical evacuation to Abidjan, Accra, or France is essential for serious conditions. Pre-arrange medevac capability before any Ouagadougou engagement.
- Foreign nationals previously present in Burkina Faso have been advised to leave by their governments. Several international organisations and diplomatic missions have scaled back or suspended operations. The operating environment for international personnel is among the most severely restricted in West Africa.

Ouagadougou is the capital of Burkina Faso, a landlocked West African country that has become one of the most severely affected states in the Sahel jihadist insurgency. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province have conducted attacks across the country since 2015, resulting in more than 2 million internally displaced persons by 2024 per UNHCR, the effective loss of government control over significant territories, and severe restrictions on humanitarian access. Ouagadougou itself has been the site of multiple terrorist attacks, including the 2016 Splendid Hotel attack that killed approximately 30 people and the 2018 attacks on the French embassy and the general staff headquarters. Two military coups in 2022 left Captain Ibrahim Traore's MPSR junta in control of the government.

The FCDO advises against all travel to Burkina Faso, including Ouagadougou. The US State Department classifies Burkina Faso at Level 4 (Do Not Travel). This page serves as a security context reference for organisations monitoring the situation in Burkina Faso or managing remote assets. Remote risk assessment and planning support are available for Burkina Faso-related work. Any essential presence in Ouagadougou must be assessed case by case by specialist Sahel conflict-environment operators. No provider can make promises about security conditions in an active insurgency and terrorist environment. Sources: FCDO Burkina Faso travel advice (2026); US State Dept Burkina Faso Level 4 advisory (2026); UNHCR Burkina Faso situation reports (2024).

For regional staging and operational management, [Abidjan](/cities/abidjan/) in Cote d'Ivoire and [Accra](/cities/accra/) in Ghana are the primary regional hubs from which Burkina Faso monitoring and remote management are typically conducted.

## Frequently asked questions

### Can close protection operate in Ouagadougou?

Close protection support for Ouagadougou requires specialist Sahel conflict-environment operators with current operational knowledge. The FCDO advises against all travel to Burkina Faso, and the US State Department classifies the country at Level 4 (Do Not Travel). For essential diplomatic or humanitarian missions, EP support is available from specialist operators, assessed case by case against current conditions. No provider can make promises about conditions in an active terrorist and insurgency environment. Remote risk assessment and planning support are available from regional hubs.

### What is the jihadist insurgency situation in Burkina Faso?

Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province have been conducting attacks across Burkina Faso since 2015. The insurgency has spread from the north and east toward the capital and now affects large parts of the country, with more than 2 million people displaced. JNIM has conducted attacks in Ouagadougou itself, including the 2016 Splendid Hotel attack and the 2018 attacks on the French embassy and general staff headquarters. Two military coups in 2022 have not resolved the security crisis.

### What happened in Burkina Faso's 2022 coups?

Two military coups occurred in Burkina Faso in 2022. In January 2022, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba led a coup that overthrew elected President Roch Kabore, citing the government's inability to address the jihadist insurgency. In October 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traore overthrew Damiba, again citing insufficient security progress. Captain Traore leads the MPSR (Mouvement Patriotique pour la Sauvegarde et la Restauration) military junta which has governed since. The military government expelled French military forces and has sought new security partnerships.

### Which regional city should serve as the staging base for Burkina Faso monitoring?

Abidjan in Cote d'Ivoire is the primary regional staging base for organisations monitoring Burkina Faso or managing Burkina Faso assets remotely. Abidjan has direct flight connections to Ouagadougou, good medical infrastructure, and a stable operating environment. Accra in Ghana provides an alternative regional base. Both cities are used by international organisations managing remote operations or humanitarian response related to the Burkina Faso crisis.