Close Protection in Moscow

Moscow in 2026 presents a category of security challenge distinct from other P1 cities. The FCDO advises against all travel to Russia, citing not only terrorism and conflict, but an explicitly named risk that British nationals may be detained as a tool of diplomatic pressure. This separates Moscow from cities with conventional crime or terrorism profiles: the threat source includes the state itself.

The 2024-2026 threat landscape

The March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack killed 145 people when IS-claimed gunmen opened fire at a packed concert venue near Moscow. It was the deadliest terror attack in Russia since Beslan. The FSB subsequently conducted raids and arrests, but the event confirmed that IS retains both the intent and the capability to conduct coordinated mass-casualty attacks on Russian soil.

Separately, the Ukraine conflict continues to produce security incidents within Russia. Drone attacks have struck civilian infrastructure and residential areas in Moscow and surrounding regions. The frequency and scale vary, but the baseline unpredictability remains a planning consideration for any corporate visitor.

For British nationals specifically, the most significant risk is not terrorism or street crime. It is state detention. The FCDO has documented cases where British nationals were arrested on charges that included activities carried out entirely outside Russia. This risk is not addressed by conventional security measures.

Communications security

State surveillance in Russia is comprehensive and legal. The FSB has statutory authority to monitor electronic communications. Hotel rooms, meeting spaces, and vehicles should be treated as surveilled environments. Corporate travellers handling sensitive commercial information should operate on the assumption that unencrypted conversations in Moscow can be accessed by state intelligence services.

This does not make Moscow unworkable for business purposes. It means that communications protocols, device management, and document handling require the same discipline that applies in any environment where state intelligence interest in commercial discussions is a realistic possibility.

The regulatory environment for security

Private security in Russia is regulated under Federal Law No. 2487-1. Operators require Rosgvardiya registration. Foreign security companies face significant restrictions: in practice, all security operations require Russian-licensed personnel. This remains the case despite sanctions, though the working environment for operators with Western business connections has become more complex.

We maintain a network of Russian-licensed operators who meet our vetting criteria. Service availability is subject to change as the regulatory and sanctions environment evolves. All assignments include a sanctions compliance review before engagement.

Practical operations

Our detailed risk assessment for Moscow covers current threat scoring, zone guidance, and operational protocols. The FCDO Moscow travel safety guide provides current advisory status and consular contact details.

For organisations with essential business in Russia: obtain legal counsel review of sanctions exposure before any commercial engagement; register with the British Embassy before departure; establish a clear communications and extraction protocol; and operate a device policy that treats Russian-operated networks as untrusted.

Source: FCDO Russia travel advisory (April 2026). Crocus City Hall attack: Russian Investigative Committee confirmed casualty figures, March 2024. Rosgvardiya licensing requirements under Federal Law No. 2487-1.