# Security Assessment: Kabul

Canonical page: https://closeprotectionhire.com/cities/kabul/

Security services in Kabul, Afghanistan. Risk assessment and essential travel security for one of the world's most complex operating environments under Taliban governance.


## Threats

- **Terrorism (Islamic State Khorasan Province)**: Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) remains active and has conducted mass-casualty attacks in Kabul since the Taliban takeover in 2021. Targets have included mosques, government facilities, educational institutions, and areas with foreign or minority population concentration. IS-KP has specifically targeted Shia and Hazara communities. Source: FCDO Afghanistan travel advice, April 2026.
- **Kidnapping**: Kidnapping risk for foreign nationals in Afghanistan is critical. Both criminal networks and IS-KP have kidnapped foreign nationals. The Taliban's capacity and motivation to respond to kidnapping cases involving foreign nationals is unreliable. The Western consular network that would traditionally support kidnapping response has been largely withdrawn from Afghanistan.
- **Taliban Governance and Arbitrary Detention**: The Taliban governs Afghanistan with no formal rule of law framework aligned to international norms. Arbitrary detention of foreign nationals has occurred. Activities that appear routine elsewhere (photography, journalism, NGO work, meeting Afghan civil society representatives) can result in detention. Women travellers face severe additional movement restrictions under Taliban policy.
- **IED and Complex Attack**: Afghanistan has one of the highest IED incident rates globally. Improvised explosive devices target vehicles and personnel in urban and rural areas. Complex attacks combining vehicle bombs with armed assault have continued in Kabul under Taliban governance. The airport has been a specific target. Source: FCDO Afghanistan, April 2026.
- **No Western Consular Cover**: Most Western embassies are closed or operating from third countries. The UK Embassy suspended operations in August 2021. The US Embassy has not reopened. This means standard consular emergency response is not available for most Western nationals. Emergency evacuation, legal assistance, and hospital liaison typically available through consular channels must be planned through private means.

## Regulations

- **Licensing**: There is no functioning civil private security licensing framework in the conventional sense. Afghan security companies that continue operating do so under arrangements with the Taliban. Vetting for Afghanistan requires different criteria than for other markets, including assessment of Taliban relationships and ability to operate without drawing Taliban interference.
- **Firearms**: Afghanistan's security regulatory environment is governed by the Taliban. Armed private security requires Taliban approval. Most established international security companies have withdrawn operations from Afghanistan. The practical regulatory framework is Taliban permission-based rather than a functioning civil licensing system.
- **Foreign operators**: Foreign security operators require Taliban approval, which is rarely granted formally. Operations are conducted through local Afghan entities with the appropriate political and tribal relationships. Most Western security companies do not currently operate in Afghanistan outside of very specific contracted international organisation work.

## Zones

Lower-risk areas:

- Green Zone (Wazir Akbar Khan): Former diplomatic quarter. Some hardened infrastructure remains but has been subject to Taliban security controls. Limited international presence.
- Kabul International Airport (HKIA) perimeter: Under Taliban military control. The site of the 2021 IS-KP suicide bombing that killed 170 people.

Elevated-risk areas:

- Everywhere in Kabul should be treated as elevated risk. Zone distinctions from the pre-2021 period are no longer a reliable safety guide.
- Markets and public gathering areas carry IS-KP attack risk. Shia mosques and Hazara community areas are specifically targeted.
- Roads between Kabul and other cities carry IED and highway robbery risk beyond city limits.

## Emergency contacts

- Taliban Security Forces (ANDSF successor): 119
- 112 (general emergency line, limited functionality; for an ambulance in Kabul dial 102, which is the number the FCDO and the Ministry of Public Health both give): 112 (source: Relabelled 31 Aug 2026. FCDO Afghanistan travel advice, health section, states: 'There are limited public ambulance services in Afghanistan. The telephone number for the ambulance service in Kabul is 102 and each province has a separate emergency number.' The Afghan Ministry of Public Health says the same on its homepage. 112 was previously labelled here as the ambulance number with no source. It is NOT deleted, because no source shows 112 fails to connect, but it must not be presented as the ambulance number. Do not relabel it back.)
- Afghan Red Crescent: +93 20 220 0317
- ICRC Kabul: +93 20 250 6001
- Kabul ambulance service, free, 24 hours: 102 (source: Afghan Ministry of Public Health official site moph.gov.af/en, which states Kabul Ambulance provides 24/7 free of charge services and to call 102; FCDO Afghanistan travel advice health page at gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/afghanistan/health independently states the telephone number for the ambulance service in Kabul is 102, verified 2026-09-02)
- French Medical Institute for Mothers and Children (FMIC), Kabul University Road, Aliabad: +93 79 107 0000 (source: fmic.org.af official site, which describes a 176-bed tertiary hospital in Kabul with an emergency service and gives +93 (0) 79 1070 000; the site was carrying news items dated April 2026 when checked, indicating current operation, verified 2026-09-02)
- Ministry of Public Health, Sehat-e-Ama Square, Wazir Akbar Khan Road: +93 20 230 1374 (source: moph.gov.af/en official site contact block, verified 2026-09-02)
- UK consular assistance for Afghanistan, remote only (British Embassy Kabul suspended in-country operations in August 2021): +44 20 7008 5000 (source: gov.uk/government/world/organisations/british-embassy-kabul states the embassy suspended in-country operations in August 2021, all UK diplomatic and consular staff were withdrawn, and consular assistance can only be provided remotely; gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/afghanistan/getting-help gives the FCDO 24-hour number 020 7008 5000 and lists 119 as the police number for Afghanistan, verified 2026-09-02)

## Warnings

- FCDO advises against all travel to Afghanistan. The US State Dept rates Afghanistan as Level 4: Do Not Travel. There are no exceptions to this advisory for standard visitors.
- Western consular cover is effectively unavailable. Plan emergency response, medical evacuation, and legal support entirely through private channels before departure.
- Women travellers face specific restrictions under Taliban policy including requirements for a male guardian (mahram) for travel and restrictions on movement, dress, and employment. These are enforced actively.
- All photography in public spaces and near any infrastructure carries detention risk under Taliban policy. This includes mobile phone photography.

Kabul is the capital of Afghanistan, a country of approximately 40 million people governed by the Taliban since the fall of the internationally-recognised government in August 2021. It was previously the base for Western military operations and the associated security, development, and diplomatic infrastructure that operated for two decades. Most of that infrastructure has now withdrawn.

FCDO advises against all travel to Afghanistan. The US State Dept rates Afghanistan at Level 4: Do Not Travel. Kabul represents the most operationally complex city in our assessment framework.

## The post-2021 security environment

The Taliban takeover in August 2021 fundamentally changed Kabul's operating environment. The Western consular network withdrew. The Afghan National Security Forces, which provided the security framework for international operations for twenty years, dissolved. IS-KP has conducted sustained attacks in Kabul targeting mosques, schools, and crowded areas. The city's security has not stabilised in the sense that would allow standard corporate operations.

IS-KP's campaign against Shia and Hazara communities has produced some of the most lethal terrorist attacks globally in the years since 2021. IS-KP has also targeted Taliban military and administrative facilities, demonstrating continued operational capability in the capital.

## Who still operates in Kabul

A limited number of international organisations and NGOs continue operations in Afghanistan under Taliban-approved frameworks. This requires specific Taliban liaison, accepted operating mandates, and security infrastructure that is bespoke to the Afghanistan environment. Development sector operations, humanitarian organisations, and specific infrastructure projects account for most current foreign presence.

For corporate visitors outside these frameworks, the question is whether any commercial purpose justifies the security overhead and the acceptance of a risk level that is categorically different from any other city in our network.

## Planning an Afghanistan assignment

Any Afghanistan engagement begins with a pre-visit assessment that covers current IS-KP activity patterns, Taliban policy environment relevant to the visitor's profile, evacuation options (overland routes, charter flight availability, consular options through third-country embassies that remain in Kabul), and medical evacuation capacity.

We do not treat Afghanistan as a standard assignment. The planning process is longer, the operator selection criteria are stricter, and the emergency protocols are more detailed than for any other city we cover.
For comparable operating environments in our network, see our [Karachi city briefing](/cities/karachi/) and [Mumbai city briefing](/cities/mumbai/).

## Frequently asked questions

### Is it possible to operate in Kabul at all as a foreign national?

Limited operations continue in Kabul, primarily through international organisations, NGOs operating under Taliban-approved frameworks, and specific development sector activities. These operations typically involve significant security infrastructure, pre-arranged Taliban liaison, and evacuation planning that would not be appropriate for standard corporate travel. For corporate visits, the question is whether the purpose justifies the risk and overhead.

### What has changed since the Taliban takeover in 2021?

The primary changes for security planning are: withdrawal of Western consular infrastructure, collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces and the pre-existing security regulatory framework, IS-KP's escalation of attacks against civilian and minority targets, and the enforcement of Taliban social restrictions that directly affect female staff and certain visitor profiles. The IED threat has not decreased and IS-KP capability has demonstrated continued sophistication.

### Can you provide security operators for Afghanistan?

We can identify vetted Afghan operators with post-2021 operational track records and appropriate Taliban relationship management capability for specifically assessed assignments. We require a full brief before any Afghanistan engagement. We do not dispatch operators to Afghanistan without a pre-visit risk assessment, confirmed purpose, emergency evacuation plan, and client acknowledgement of the risk level.

### What is the IS-KP threat to civilians in Kabul?

Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has conducted repeated mass-casualty attacks in Kabul since 2021, targeting minority communities, mosques, education centres, and locations associated with foreign or government activity. The group has demonstrated sustained capability for complex attacks. Any movement plan must treat crowded public locations and predictable gatherings as elevated-risk and minimise time spent at them.

### What restrictions apply to female staff and visitors in Kabul?

Taliban authorities enforce social restrictions that directly affect women, including requirements around dress, male guardianship (mahram) for certain movements, and access to some workplaces and public spaces. These rules affect the feasibility and planning of any visit involving female personnel, and they can change with limited notice. A current briefing on the prevailing restrictions is essential before travel.