Security for Rare Earth and Critical Minerals Operations | CloseProtectionHire

Security for Rare Earth and Critical Minerals Operations

The energy transition has made a set of mineral extraction operations strategically significant in a way that was not true fifteen years ago. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements, copper, manganese, and graphite are essential inputs for electric vehicle batteries, wind turbines, semiconductor production, and military systems. The countries and regions where these minerals are found in extractable concentrations are often not the countries where the demand exists – and many of them have security environments that require careful professional assessment.

This article covers the security framework for companies operating in critical minerals supply chains: the specific threat profiles by key mineral and geography, the regulatory frameworks that govern security conduct, the community relations imperative, and the practical requirements for field teams operating in high-risk environments.

Why Critical Minerals Are a Distinct Security Context

The geography of critical minerals is not random. Cobalt concentrates in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which supplies approximately 70 percent of global production. Lithium deposits are primarily in Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina – the Lithium Triangle – plus significant reserves in Australia. Rare earth elements are found across numerous countries but processed predominantly in China. Nickel is concentrated in Indonesia and the Philippines. Myanmar supplies jade, amber, and significant quantities of rare earths in territory controlled by armed factions.

This geography means that critical minerals operations are disproportionately concentrated in: countries with active armed group presence, countries with histories of resource nationalism and expropriation, countries with governance gaps that leave security largely to the company’s own resources, and countries where the regulatory framework for private security is either weak or complex.

The security professional advising a company entering any of these environments needs to start with a specific, current threat assessment – not a generic template. The DRC in 2025 is different from the DRC in 2020, and different again from southern DRC versus the East. The Lithium Triangle in 2025 has specific community blockade patterns in the Atacama that do not apply to Australian lithium operations. Generic approaches produce generic failures.

DRC Cobalt: The Most Complex Security Environment

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s cobalt-producing regions – primarily the provinces of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba in the south, with secondary deposits in the East – present a layered security challenge.

Industrial-scale operations (Glencore’s Kamoto Copper Company, China Molybdenum’s Tenke Fungurume, Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula) maintain substantial security infrastructure: internal security forces, perimeter protection, satellite communications, helicopter evacuation capability, and intelligence sharing networks. Their security operations are broadly governed by VPSHR commitments.

Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) operations represent the complex underbelly of the supply chain. ASM cobalt miners – estimated at 150,000 to 200,000 in southern DRC – operate with minimal regulatory oversight, in physically dangerous conditions, and in areas where armed groups may tax or control extraction. Supply chain due diligence for cobalt – required under the EU Battery Regulation (effective 2024, with phased traceability requirements) and referenced in the OECD DDG – must trace sourcing back through trading houses and aggregators to determine whether ASM cobalt from armed-group-controlled areas is entering the supply chain.

The ITSCI (ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative), operated by the ITRI industry association, and the IPIS (International Peace Information Service) mapping of armed group control of mining sites, are the primary due diligence tools for eastern DRC sourcing. Companies sourcing DRC cobalt without reference to these tools are operating below the minimum diligence standard expected by institutional investors and regulatory frameworks.

For security personnel deployed to southern DRC operations, the threat environment is distinct from the East. The Haut-Katanga and Lualaba region has lower armed group density than North/South Kivu but is not without risk: artisanal miner incursions into industrial sites, politically motivated community blockades, and petty crime are documented risks. The FCDO advises heightened caution for most of DRC outside major urban centres.

Lithium Triangle: Community Conflict and Indigenous Rights

Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina hold approximately 58 percent of the world’s identified lithium reserves. The Atacama Desert salt flats and the Bolivian Salar de Uyuni are the two most significant deposits. Indonesia and Australia hold additional significant reserves.

The security challenge in the Lithium Triangle is primarily community-based rather than armed-group-based. Indigenous communities, particularly in the Chilean Atacama where the Atacameno people have water rights and cultural connections to the salar, have mounted sustained opposition to lithium extraction operations that threaten water sources and traditional territories.

In Chile, the constitutional Indigenous rights framework and the Water Code create legal structures around consultation and consent that companies have navigated with varying success. Albemarle and SQM, the two primary licensed producers, have faced community opposition that has periodically disrupted operations and attracted international attention. Lithium Chile, a smaller explorer, faced sustained community blockades in 2022 that halted field work entirely.

In Bolivia, the state’s nationalisation framework (Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos, or YLB, holds the national lithium mandate) means that international companies can only participate through joint ventures with the state. This political structure is itself a security risk: political transitions affect the joint venture terms and the operating environment.

Argentina’s lithium sector is more open to international investment, with provinces competing to attract operators. The security environment in the northwest Jujuy and Salta provinces – where most production is concentrated – is manageable, but indigenous consultation requirements under Law 23,302 and ILO Convention 169 (ratified by Argentina) create legal obligations that, if not met, generate community conflict that escalates quickly.

The operational lesson from the Lithium Triangle is that the security framework and the community relations framework are not separable. Operations that have failed to conduct genuine free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) processes face blockades that cannot be resolved by security measures alone.

Myanmar: Armed Group Control of Critical Minerals

Myanmar’s jade and amber industries are overwhelmingly controlled by military-aligned or armed ethnic faction interests. Human Rights Watch and Global Witness have documented the military’s direct stake in jade extraction in Kachin State (Hpakant) and the integration of armed groups – including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) – into the extraction and trade chain.

Rare earth operations in Kachin and Shan States have grown rapidly since 2020, primarily supplying Chinese processing facilities. The operations are largely controlled by ethnic armed organisations operating outside central government oversight. International companies sourcing minerals from Myanmar – directly or through intermediaries – face significant exposure under the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015, the US OFAC Myanmar-related sanctions designations, and the EU’s dual-use and arms export controls. Due diligence on Myanmar-origin minerals is a legal compliance requirement, not merely an ethical one.

For personnel considering travel to Myanmar for business purposes, the security environment post-2021 coup is broadly assessed as high risk by the FCDO, US State Department, and all major commercial risk providers. The civilian conflict has spread substantially from its pre-coup geographic bounds.

The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights

The VPSHR framework, established in 2000 through a US-UK initiative involving governments, extractive companies, and human rights organisations, provides the most widely referenced standard for security conduct in mining and energy operations.

The three components of the framework are: risk assessment (systematic identification of human rights risks associated with the security environment, including past security force conduct, conflict history, and rule of law status); public security engagement (dialogue with and monitoring of state security forces – police and military – to ensure their operations in or around company assets comply with international human rights standards); and private security management (vetting, training, contract standards, use of force protocols, and accountability mechanisms for contracted security providers).

VPSHR participation is voluntary but is referenced in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in ICMM membership requirements, and by institutional investors through ESG screening frameworks. Non-participation is a reputational and investor relations issue for publicly listed extractive companies. ICOCA certification for private security contractors is the operational tool that gives VPSHR private security commitments practical substance.

The Junior Explorer Security Gap

Major producers (Glencore, Anglo American, BHP, Rio Tinto) operate with dedicated security departments, established VPSHR commitments, and detailed field security frameworks. Junior explorers – small-cap listed companies in the early stages of identifying and proving up mineral deposits – typically do not.

A junior explorer may deploy a geological field team to a remote, high-risk location with a field geologist, a local guide, and a mobile phone. The ICMM’s safety data consistently shows that the fatality rate per person-hour worked is higher at smaller operations than at majors. The gaps that characterise under-resourced junior operations include: no satellite communications, no formal check-in protocol, no crisis response plan, no MEDEVAC insurance, no security threat briefing before deployment, and no vetted local liaison.

The minimum field security framework for a junior explorer deploying teams to any location assessed as medium risk or above includes: satellite communications device (Garmin inReach, Iridium GO, or equivalent), a daily check-in protocol with a designated base contact who has a defined escalation procedure if check-in is missed, travel medical and MEDEVAC insurance that specifically covers the operational geography, a pre-deployment security briefing from a specialist provider (not an internal briefing from staff who have not assessed the current environment), and a vetted local liaison with specific security awareness and community knowledge.

This is a modest infrastructure requirement. For a field deployment that may expose a geological team to armed group areas, community blockades, or remote emergency scenarios, it is the minimum necessary for a defensible duty of care.

Regulatory and Supply Chain Diligence Requirements

Companies sourcing critical minerals face an expanding regulatory framework:

The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation (Regulation 2017/821, effective January 2021) requires EU importers of tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold (3TG) above specified thresholds to implement OECD DDG supply chain due diligence. The regulation does not currently cover lithium, cobalt, or rare earths – but the EU Battery Regulation (Regulation 2023/1542) introduces supply chain due diligence requirements specifically for battery minerals, phased in from 2025.

Dodd-Frank Section 1502 (US, 2010) requires US Securities and Exchange Commission-listed companies to report on whether their products contain conflict minerals originating from DRC or adjacent countries, and to exercise supply chain due diligence. The SEC’s implementation rules, which have been subject to legal challenge but remain in effect, require annual Form SD filings.

The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 Section 54 requires commercial organisations with annual turnover above GBP 36 million to publish a modern slavery statement covering their supply chains. For critical minerals operations in high-risk countries, this statement requires engagement with the specific supply chain routes and the human rights risks associated with them.

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (DDG, 2011, revised 2016) is the international baseline. Its five-step framework – management systems, risk identification, risk management, independent audit, and public reporting – is referenced across all the regulatory frameworks above and provides a coherent due diligence structure.

For the broader security context for extractive sector operations, the security guide for mining and extractive industries covers the full range of physical security considerations. The remote and off-grid operational security framework, applicable to field geology teams operating in areas without infrastructure, is covered in security for remote and off-grid operations.