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Security During Political Transitions and Elections | CloseProtectionHire

Q: "Why are elections especially dangerous for corporate travellers?"

"Elections concentrate political tension into a predictable calendar event, creating a period of elevated violence risk that is well-documented in the data. ACLED's Electoral Violence Dataset shows that 73% of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2015 and 2024 were associated with at least one violent incident. The risk is not limited to polling day -- campaign periods, result announcements, and the 72-hour window following a disputed result are historically the highest-risk phases. Corporate travellers who are in-country during these phases are not targeted as principals, but are at elevated risk from civil unrest, movement restriction, and breakdown of normal security services."

Q: "How should corporate travel policy address election periods?"

"The corporate travel policy should identify elections in high-risk countries at least 90 days in advance (electoral calendars are published annually by IDEA and ACLED). Non-essential travel should be subject to enhanced authorisation requirements from 30 days before polling through to 72 hours after results. Essential travel during the election window requires additional security measures: vetted secure accommodation, vetted vehicles and drivers, movement restricted to daytime hours, clear communication of itinerary to an in-country security contact or embassy, and predefined evacuation triggers."

Q: "What happened during the Mexico 2024 election from a security perspective?"

"Mexico's June 2, 2024 general election -- which produced Claudia Sheinbaum's election as president -- was preceded by unprecedented electoral violence. The Global Network for Rights and Development documented 22 candidates killed during the campaign period. CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel exercised effective veto power over candidate selection in multiple municipalities in Jalisco, Michoacan, and Guerrero. For corporate travellers, the election cycle produced heightened cartel activity and increased FCDO advisory updates for affected states. Post-election, the transition period to October 2024 was relatively orderly at the federal level."

Q: "What triggers should activate a corporate evacuation plan during political unrest?"

"Evacuation triggers should be defined in advance and linked to observable, specific indicators -- not vague assessments. Appropriate triggers include: FCDO or US State Department advisory upgrade to 'advise against all travel,' closure of the principal airport, declaration of a state of emergency, reports of credible threats against foreign nationals or businesses, loss of contact with local security point of contact for more than four hours, or the appearance of armed groups in the vicinity of accommodation or offices. Define triggers before you deploy, not during an evolving crisis."

Q: "Are elections in Turkey a security risk for business travellers?"

"Turkey's elections are contested with significant political polarisation, but the direct violence risk during elections for foreign business travellers in Istanbul and Ankara has been limited. The sustained terrorism threat (FCDO Level 4 -- likely) applies year-round and is not primarily election-linked. The 2023 presidential election and the March 2024 local elections -- in which the CHP secured Istanbul and Ankara -- produced large street celebrations but no significant violence targeting the business community. The terrorism threat from PKK-aligned groups and IS-linked actors is the dominant security concern for travellers to Turkey."

Security guide for corporate travellers and executives during election periods and political transitions: risk data, P1 city profiles, movement restrictions, evacuation triggers, and travel policy amendments.

4 May 2026

Written by James Whitfield

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Political transitions and election periods are among the most predictable high-risk phases in a country’s security calendar. Unlike spontaneous events, elections are announced months or years in advance. Yet corporate travel risk assessments frequently fail to integrate electoral calendars until a crisis is already developing.

This guide addresses the security implications of election periods and political transitions for corporate travellers, security planners, and executives with country-level exposures in high-risk markets.

The Data: Elections and Violence

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Electoral Violence Dataset provides the most comprehensive publicly available analysis of election-related violence globally. Key findings from the 2024 edition:

73% of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2015 and 2024 were associated with at least one violent incident
The highest-risk phases are the campaign period (from 30 days before polling), the 24 hours before and after polling, and the 72-hour period following result announcement
Result disputes – where the losing party contests the outcome – extend the risk period significantly and increase the intensity of violence

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Global State of Democracy 2024 identifies democratic backsliding in 25 states in 2023, including countries with significant corporate travel exposures: Bangladesh, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Israel, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa, Turkey, and others. Backsliding correlates with increased likelihood of disputed elections and politically motivated security incidents.

For security planners, these figures are not abstract. They translate into: non-essential travel to Sub-Saharan African countries should be reviewed against the electoral calendar as a matter of routine, not as an exceptional response to visible crisis.

Nigeria: 2023 and the 2027 Planning Horizon

Nigeria’s February-March 2023 presidential and gubernatorial elections are the most recent high-data-point reference for West Africa’s largest economy.

The 2023 election cycle featured:

Presidential election on February 25, 2023, with the APC candidate Bola Tinubu winning a contested plurality (NNPP and PDP challenged the result through the courts)
Governorship elections on March 18, 2023
INEC (Independent National Electoral Commission) logistics failures including delayed material delivery and technical problems with the BVAS electronic accreditation system, which contributed to result credibility disputes
Post-election violence in Lagos (Lagos Island, Eti-Osa), Rivers State (Port Harcourt), and Kano – documented by OSAC Nigeria 2024 as a repeating pattern

For the 2027 election cycle, which should be on corporate security radar from mid-2026, the planning baseline is:

Flag the election window from 30 days before presidential polling through 72 hours after final result confirmation
Classify non-essential travel to Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Kano as requiring enhanced authorisation during this window
Review accommodation security: preference for international-standard hotels with controlled access over serviced apartments in mixed-use buildings
Confirm in-country security support: vetted driver and vehicle for all movements, crisis line with local security contact, embassy emergency registration

Mexico: 2024 – Electoral Violence at Unprecedented Scale

Mexico’s June 2, 2024 general election was the largest in the country’s history, with votes for the presidency, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, state governorships, and thousands of municipal positions.

The security dimension of the 2024 cycle was defined by extraordinary levels of candidate-level violence during the campaign. The Global Network for Rights and Development documented 22 candidates killed during the campaign period, with additional candidates and campaign workers subject to threats and forced withdrawal. CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel exercised effective candidate veto in municipal races across Jalisco, Michoacan, Guerrero, Veracruz, and Tamaulipas – either through direct threats or through the withdrawal of candidates after intimidation.

For corporate travellers in Mexico during election periods, the primary risk is not direct targeting of foreign nationals (which remained very low during the 2024 cycle) but rather the elevated cartel operational activity that accompanies electoral competition for control of local government. The periods immediately before and after municipal and state elections in cartel-contested states produce heightened checkpoint activity, road blocks, and incidents between cartel groups.

FCDO advisory updates for Mexico increased in frequency during the three months preceding the June 2024 election. Security departments with Mexico exposure should maintain a 30-day advisory monitoring protocol in the pre-election period for future cycles.

The federal-level transition from AMLO to Sheinbaum (inauguration October 1, 2024) was conducted without significant security incident. Mexico City during the transition period was under elevated police presence but commercially normal.

South Africa: 2024 – Coalition Government and Service Delivery Risk

South Africa’s May 29, 2024 general election produced a historic result: for the first time since 1994, the ANC failed to secure a parliamentary majority, receiving 40.2% of the vote. The Government of National Unity (GNU) formed between ANC, DA, IFP, and smaller parties represented a political realignment with significant business implications.

From a security perspective, the election period itself was relatively orderly for a country of South Africa’s complexity. The key security risk in South Africa’s political cycle is not election day violence but service delivery protest – community-level unrest triggered by infrastructure failures, unemployment, and governance failures that can shut road access in townships and industrial areas and periodically escalate to arson and looting.

The GNU’s formation introduced the Jacob Zuma factor: the MKP (uMkhonto we Sizwe Party), which Zuma led after his ANC expulsion, received 14.5% of the vote. Zuma’s political positioning creates ongoing mobilisation potential for unrest in KwaZulu-Natal, as demonstrated by the July 2021 unrest (354 dead, USD 3.4bn in damage) that followed his imprisonment.

Security planning for South Africa should:

Maintain real-time monitoring of service delivery protest activity (updated daily by SAPS and commercial risk providers)
Avoid road movement through known protest corridors in townships adjacent to industrial areas
Flag any significant political development involving Zuma or MKP in KwaZulu-Natal as a potential unrest trigger

Turkey: Sustained Political Tension With Ongoing Terrorism Threat

Turkey’s political security environment has been reshaped by the AKP consolidation of power over the past decade. The May 2023 presidential election, in which Erdogan won with 52.2% in the second round, and the March 2024 local elections, in which the CHP retained Istanbul and Ankara under mayors Imamoglu (currently facing legal proceedings) and Yavas, produced significant political tension but limited direct violence against the business community.

For corporate travellers, the dominant Turkey security concern is the sustained terrorism threat, not election-period unrest. The FCDO maintains a Level 4 terrorism threat assessment (attacks are likely) for Turkey, reflecting the operational presence of PKK-aligned groups and IS-affiliated actors. Istanbul, Ankara, and other major cities have experienced attack attempts, including the December 2022 Istiklal Avenue bombing (6 killed, attributed to PKK) and the February 2024 Caglayan Courthouse attack (2 killed, attributed to DHKP-C).

Election-period travel in Turkey requires awareness of large political gatherings (both pro-government and opposition demonstrations are large by Western European standards) and avoidance of areas around major political events.

Bangladesh: The August 2024 Transition

Bangladesh’s political transition in August 2024 – in which Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government fell following mass student protests centred on quota reforms – illustrates the rapid and unpredictable nature of political transition risk. The protests escalated within weeks from a student campus issue to a national movement; Hasina fled to India on August 5, 2024.

Corporate travellers in Dhaka during the peak protest period in late July and early August faced movement restrictions, communications disruptions (internet shutdown imposed by the government), and the risk of proximity to protest-security force confrontations. Travellers with no awareness of the developing situation and no in-country security support faced significant difficulty.

The Bangladesh episode is a reference case for security managers: political transitions do not always follow an electoral calendar and may develop faster than standard threat assessment cycles can track.

Corporate Travel Policy: Election Cycle Amendments

The following is a framework for amending corporate travel policy to address election periods and political transitions:

90 days before election: Flag election on corporate travel risk calendar. Issue advisory to all staff with planned travel to the country. Non-essential travel does not yet require enhanced authorisation, but should be noted.

30 days before election: Non-essential travel requires manager and security function approval. Essential travel requires security briefing and enhanced precautions (vetted vehicle, confirmed accommodation, emergency contact protocol). Control Risks, Kroll, and similar providers publish election risk forecasts that should be acquired at this stage.

Election day through 72 hours post-result: Non-essential travel suspended. Essential travel requires senior management and security function approval, a security escort for in-country movement, and a pre-defined evacuation trigger matrix.

Evacuation triggers (define in advance, not during the event):

FCDO or State Department advisory upgrade to “advise against all travel”
Airport closure (check IATA NOTAM monitoring)
Declaration of a state of emergency or martial law
Armed groups in proximity to expatriate accommodation or offices
Loss of contact with local security point of contact for more than four hours
Organised violence targeting foreign nationals or businesses

Communications security during government transitions. In authoritarian states or states with newly installed governments hostile to foreign businesses, political transitions create heightened intelligence collection activity against foreign executives in-country. Applying clean device protocols (travel devices without sensitive data, VPN, no access to corporate systems from in-country devices), reducing digital footprint, and avoiding any comment on domestic political developments is appropriate operational security during these periods.

For the political risk assessment framework that underlies corporate travel policy design, see our political risk guide for corporate travellers. For organisations that need to translate risk assessments into operational evacuation plans, see our country evacuation planning guide.

Summary

Key takeaways

Election calendars should be integrated into corporate travel risk planning 90 days in advance

IDEA and ACLED publish electoral calendars annually. Security departments should identify elections in all countries where the organisation has travel exposures and flag the pre-election, polling, and post-result periods as requiring enhanced authorisation for non-essential travel.

The 72-hour post-result window is the highest-risk phase in disputed elections

Election day itself is often calmer than expected. The post-result period -- particularly when results are close, disputed, or produce an unexpected outcome -- is historically the highest-risk phase. Movement restrictions and enhanced security measures should be maintained for at least 72 hours after results are announced.

Nigeria's pattern is a reliable planning reference for 2027

Nigeria's February-March 2023 elections produced a documented pattern of post-result violence in Lagos, Rivers State, and Kano. This pattern informs security planning for the 2027 cycle, which should be flagged in corporate travel risk assessments from mid-2026.

Foreign executives should maintain low profile during political transitions

When a government changes -- particularly through non-electoral means (coup, constitutional crisis) or after a disputed election -- foreign businesses and their executives can become targets for nationalist or political violence. Maintaining a low public profile, avoiding political commentary, and suspending any activities that could be perceived as taking sides in domestic political disputes are appropriate precautions.

Authoritarian government transitions create specific intelligence threats to foreign executives

During political transitions in authoritarian states (Russia, China, Belarus, Gulf monarchies facing succession uncertainty), the intelligence services may conduct heightened collection activities targeting foreign executives in-country. Communications security, clean device protocols, and reduced digital footprint are particularly important during these periods.

FAQ

Frequently Asked Questions

Elections concentrate political tension into a predictable calendar event, creating a period of elevated violence risk that is well-documented in the data. ACLED’s Electoral Violence Dataset shows that 73% of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2015 and 2024 were associated with at least one violent incident. The risk is not limited to polling day – campaign periods, result announcements, and the 72-hour window following a disputed result are historically the highest-risk phases. Corporate travellers who are in-country during these phases are not targeted as principals, but are at elevated risk from civil unrest, movement restriction, and breakdown of normal security services.

The corporate travel policy should identify elections in high-risk countries at least 90 days in advance (electoral calendars are published annually by IDEA and ACLED). Non-essential travel should be subject to enhanced authorisation requirements from 30 days before polling through to 72 hours after results. Essential travel during the election window requires additional security measures: vetted secure accommodation, vetted vehicles and drivers, movement restricted to daytime hours, clear communication of itinerary to an in-country security contact or embassy, and predefined evacuation triggers.

Mexico’s June 2, 2024 general election – which produced Claudia Sheinbaum’s election as president – was preceded by unprecedented electoral violence. The Global Network for Rights and Development documented 22 candidates killed during the campaign period. CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel exercised effective veto power over candidate selection in multiple municipalities in Jalisco, Michoacan, and Guerrero. For corporate travellers, the election cycle produced heightened cartel activity and increased FCDO advisory updates for affected states. Post-election, the transition period to October 2024 was relatively orderly at the federal level.

Evacuation triggers should be defined in advance and linked to observable, specific indicators – not vague assessments. Appropriate triggers include: FCDO or US State Department advisory upgrade to ‘advise against all travel,’ closure of the principal airport, declaration of a state of emergency, reports of credible threats against foreign nationals or businesses, loss of contact with local security point of contact for more than four hours, or the appearance of armed groups in the vicinity of accommodation or offices. Define triggers before you deploy, not during an evolving crisis.

Turkey’s elections are contested with significant political polarisation, but the direct violence risk during elections for foreign business travellers in Istanbul and Ankara has been limited. The sustained terrorism threat (FCDO Level 4 – likely) applies year-round and is not primarily election-linked. The 2023 presidential election and the March 2024 local elections – in which the CHP secured Istanbul and Ankara – produced large street celebrations but no significant violence targeting the business community. The terrorism threat from PKK-aligned groups and IS-linked actors is the dominant security concern for travellers to Turkey.

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