Security During Industrial Action and Labour Disputes | CloseProtectionHire

Security During Industrial Action and Labour Disputes

Industrial action rarely appears on corporate security risk registers until it happens. When it does, companies typically find that their standard security procedures were designed for normal operations and that the specific risks created by a strike – picket line confrontations, credential management, executive targeting, site access for non-striking staff – have not been specifically addressed.

This guide covers the security framework for companies facing industrial action: the legal context for picket line management, access credential protocols, executive personal security during disputes, and the particular challenges of prolonged high-profile industrial action.

The Security Risk Profile of a Strike

Industrial action creates a set of risks that are distinct from the company’s normal security threat picture. Understanding them before action begins is the starting point.

Physical access disruption. Pickets at site entrances can make access difficult, confrontational, or in some cases physically obstructed. This affects staff attempting to enter, deliveries, visitors, and management. The legal boundaries of picketing activity are defined by TULRCA 1992 and the Code of Practice on Picketing. In practice, the behaviour of a picket line can range from passive to actively obstructive, and the distinction between lawful and unlawful is often contested in real time.

Insider threat during the notice period. The period between the announcement of industrial action and its commencement is, from a security perspective, a transition phase where employee motivation to protect company assets is reduced and in some cases actively reversed. Document access, system access, and equipment removal are all elevated risks during this window. This is not an accusation of bad faith – it is a recognised pattern. Security teams who have reviewed insider threat incidents in corporate contexts consistently find the pre-departure or pre-action period as a documented high-risk window.

Disruption by secondary actors. Strike-support groups, solidarity networks, and activist organisations sometimes attach to industrial disputes in ways that go beyond the bargaining unit. The RMT and ASLEF rail disputes of 2022 to 2024 attracted climate activist solidarity actions at some locations. Water sector industrial action in the same period attracted environmental protest attachment. These secondary actors are not bound by the same legal constraints as the union and may have different tactics.

Executive personal security. Senior managers publicly named as decision-makers in a high-profile dispute – particularly in industries with significant public sympathy for striking workers – can become personal targets. In the water sector dispute of 2023 to 2024, several senior executives received protests at their private residences. This is a pattern with precedents in energy, rail, healthcare, and postal sector disputes.

The Legal Framework

The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) is the primary statute governing industrial action in England, Wales, and Scotland. The Code of Practice on Picketing (originally 1980, substantively updated 1992 and 2017) provides the operational guidance that courts and employers rely on.

Key points for security planning:

Lawful picketing. Picketing is lawful at or near the entrance to the picket’s own workplace, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully persuading others not to attend work. The Code recommends no more than six pickets at any one entrance. Picketing at third-party premises (secondary picketing) is unlawful under TULRCA s.224.

Obstruction. Pickets may not physically obstruct access to the site. The Highways Act 1980 provides a separate basis for obstruction-related enforcement. Security staff and management should not engage directly with pickets – that is a matter for the police if unlawful obstruction is occurring. The security role is to maintain an access corridor for those entitled to enter and to document any obstruction.

Injunctions. Where industrial action is unlawful – because it was called without a valid ballot, without proper notice, or because it constitutes secondary action – an injunction is available in the courts. The application must be made promptly and with documented evidence. Employment law specialists should be engaged from the outset of any significant dispute to advise on the legal position and the injunction threshold.

The Employment Relations (Flexible Working) Act 2023 and more recent legislation have not materially changed the industrial action framework, but the general trajectory of employment law makes legal advice on any specific dispute situation essential before drawing conclusions from this summary.

Access Credential Management

The single most controllable risk created by industrial action is access. Before action commences – or, if the notice is short, as soon as possible after it is declared – a full access credential review should be completed.

The review covers:

Physical access cards and gate codes. Identify which credentials are held by employees who will be on strike and determine what level of access is appropriate for the duration. In most cases, suspended rather than cancelled is the right status – access is paused for the period of the dispute and reinstated on return. Cancelled credentials create complications on return to work and can be a source of grievance.

IT system access. Review user account privileges for employees on strike against their actual functional needs during a potential return-to-work period. High-privilege accounts, administrative access, and access to sensitive data repositories should be reviewed. This is not punitive – it is proportionate risk management for the transition period.

Alarm codes. Site alarm codes that are known to employees on strike should be changed for the duration of the action. This is standard practice and is not typically disputed.

Vehicle access. Delivery and contractor vehicle access lists should be updated to reflect the changed operational structure. Deliveries that would normally be received by striking staff need to have an alternative receiving arrangement.

For detailed guidance on insider threat and access management in transition periods, see our guide to insider threats and corporate security.

Picket Line Management

Security staff managing access during industrial action are in a difficult position. They are between the company’s operational interest in maintaining access and the lawful activity of pickets. The function must be clearly defined.

Security staff on picket line duty should be:

Briefed on the specific legal position – what pickets are entitled to do, what constitutes obstruction, and what the escalation path to police is.

Instructed not to engage in confrontational dialogue with pickets. Acknowledgement, de-escalation, and the maintenance of a clear access corridor are the functions.

Equipped with a contemporaneous incident log – time, description of incident, names where known, witnesses. This log is the basis for any subsequent legal proceedings or police involvement.

Clearly told that they are not the enforcement mechanism. If unlawful obstruction is occurring, that is a matter for the police. Security staff should contact the duty officer and document the incident.

Behavioural de-escalation training is a specific skill. Security staff who have not received it should not be placed on picket line duty without supervision.

Executive Security During High-Profile Disputes

For managing directors, chief executives, and HR directors who will be named in media coverage of a significant industrial dispute, a review of personal security is warranted before the dispute becomes public.

The review should cover:

Home address exposure. Company director addresses are publicly searchable via Companies House unless the director has suppressed them under the provisions of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECATA 2023). Address suppression for directors in exposed positions should be completed before a dispute becomes high-profile.

Route patterns. The commute between home and the workplace is predictable and publicly observable. During a dispute, route variation should be introduced. This does not require a close protection team – it requires awareness of the pattern and a deliberate policy of changing it.

Social media profile. The executive’s public social media presence, including their LinkedIn profile, should be reviewed for information that could be useful to individuals planning protest activity at their residence or public appearances.

Residential security. If protest at private residences is a realistic prospect based on the nature of the dispute and the industry, a review of the existing residential security arrangements is warranted. See our guide to protest and civil unrest in a corporate security context for the broader framework.

Prolonged Disputes: The Wapping Precedent

The Wapping dispute of January 1986 to February 1987 – when News International relocated printing operations to a new Wapping facility and dismissed approximately 5,500 SOGAT and NGA members – resulted in the largest sustained industrial policing operation in UK peacetime history. Over the fourteen months of the dispute, police made more than 1,200 arrests and over 400 people were injured in confrontations at the Wapping site.

The lessons for corporate security planning are not about the specific legal or political context of the Wapping dispute, which is historically specific. They are about duration. A sustained dispute with high public salience, significant media coverage, and strong community support for the striking workforce does not resolve in a week. Security planning for a prolonged dispute needs a different posture than a short-term contingency plan: sustainable staffing levels, a legal strategy that runs in parallel with the security operation, documented evidence gathered consistently over time, and regular threat reassessment as the dispute evolves.

P1 City Context

Industrial action security in P1 cities requires a fundamentally different framework from UK-equivalent planning.

In Nigeria, oil and gas sector industrial action has historically involved road blockades, pipeline disruption, and in some cases physical confrontation between security forces and strikers. NUPENG (National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers) and PENGASSAN strike actions have affected international oil companies operating in the Niger Delta and have required in-country security liaison and contingency planning beyond anything required in the UK context.

In Colombia, nationwide trucking strikes (paros camioneros) have resulted in road blockades that disrupt supply chains across the country, with documented incidents of violence at blockade points. Foreign companies reliant on road logistics should have contingency plans for prolonged road access restriction.

In India, general strikes (Bandh) declared at state or national level have resulted in documented fatalities in Karnataka (2023) and other states, driven by confrontations between strikers and those attempting to continue working. For companies with major operations in India, Bandh planning is a standard component of the business continuity framework.

For companies operating in multiple jurisdictions, country-specific legal advice and in-country security support are the baseline for industrial action security planning.

For the broader corporate security programme framework within which industrial action security planning sits, see our guide to corporate security programme design.