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Security for Industrial and Nuclear Decommissioning Sites | CloseProtectionHire

Q: "What are the nuclear security requirements for decommissioning sites in the UK?"

"The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) requires that sites undergoing decommissioning maintain an approved security plan throughout the decommissioning process. The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 (as amended) apply throughout decommissioning, not just during active operation. The plan must address physical protection of any remaining nuclear material, access management for a changing contractor workforce, and the secure handling and transport of radioactive waste at every stage of removal."

Q: "What does OSPAR Decision 98/3 mean for North Sea decommissioning security?"

"OSPAR Decision 98/3 prohibits dumping and leaving in place of offshore installations in the North East Atlantic, with limited exceptions. It requires most North Sea platforms to be brought ashore for decommissioning. The onshore receiving facilities -- in Scotland, the Tees Valley, and Western Norway -- are active industrial sites during operations, with access management, equipment security, and hazardous material handling requirements that persist throughout a typically multi-year decommissioning process."

Q: "Why are decommissioned industrial sites particularly vulnerable to theft and trespass?"

"Once a site moves from active operation to decommissioning, the workforce contracts sharply and the perceived security presence diminishes. This creates a window in which high-value industrial equipment -- specialist machinery, copper and non-ferrous metals, stainless steel vessels, instrumentation -- is present on site but the security overhead associated with active production has been reduced or removed. Organised plant and equipment theft groups specifically target decommissioning sites in the period between production cessation and physical demolition."

Q: "What security issues arise at nuclear decommissioning sites outside the UK?"

"The Chernobyl Exclusion Zone in Ukraine has experienced persistent incidents of unauthorised entry and removal of radioactive material for scrap metal value. The Ukrainian State Agency for Management of the Exclusion Zone (DAZV) has documented multiple such incidents. Russia's Rosatom manages a large portfolio of Soviet-era nuclear sites at various stages of decommissioning, and IAEA peer review reports have noted inconsistency in physical protection standards across this portfolio, particularly at smaller inactive sites."

Q: "Does close protection apply in the decommissioning sector?"

"Yes. Senior project managers, contract engineers, and executives overseeing decommissioning operations in high-risk markets -- particularly in Russia, Kazakhstan, and parts of West Africa where oil and gas infrastructure is being decommissioned -- face kidnap-for-ransom risk that is higher than the typical urban executive. Decommissioning sites are often in remote or peri-urban locations with limited law enforcement response. A close protection officer with industrial site experience provides both personal security and coordination with on-site safety teams."

Site security during oil, gas and nuclear decommissioning. ONR requirements, OSPAR Decision 98/3, equipment theft risk, radioactive material security and close protection for project teams.

6 May 2026

Written by James Whitfield

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The Security Challenge Specific to Decommissioning

Operating industrial sites have established security regimes: defined perimeters, access management systems, security staff aligned to shift patterns, and integration with the operational workforce. The moment a site enters decommissioning, every one of those parameters starts to change.

The workforce contracts rapidly as production lines shut down. Contractors cycle through on time-limited demolition and remediation contracts, each with different access requirements. Equipment that previously sat inside a functioning security perimeter is now being staged for removal – and its value is visible to anyone in the vicinity. The asset is being liquidated, and the security infrastructure that protected it during operation is frequently being liquidated alongside it.

That combination creates one of the most underestimated periods of physical security risk in the industrial lifecycle. Organised theft groups, trespassers, scrap metal operations, and in the case of nuclear sites, actors seeking radiological material, all specifically target this window.

The Regulatory Framework: ONR and UK Nuclear Decommissioning

In the UK, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is the competent authority for nuclear security throughout the facility lifecycle. The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 (NISR 2003), as amended, require that all nuclear licensees maintain an approved site security plan. This requirement does not lapse when a facility moves from operation to decommissioning.

The UK’s Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) manages the decommissioning and clean-up of the UK’s civil nuclear legacy. Its portfolio includes Sellafield in Cumbria – Europe’s most complex nuclear decommissioning site – as well as the former Magnox reactor fleet across the UK. The NDA’s security function operates under ONR oversight and maintains physical protection standards throughout decommissioning operations.

Sellafield illustrates the scale. The site employs around 11,000 people in decommissioning and waste management roles. The nuclear material inventory – spent fuel, intermediate level waste, and legacy ponds and silos – requires physical protection standards that are broadly equivalent to an operating nuclear facility. Decommissioning at Sellafield is expected to continue until approximately 2120.

For security planning purposes, the lesson is straightforward: nuclear security requirements do not diminish as a site winds down. They evolve. The threat profile changes – there is no longer an operating reactor to protect, but there is a nuclear material inventory that requires continuous physical protection during an extended removal and packaging programme.

OSPAR and North Sea Decommissioning

OSPAR Decision 98/3, adopted under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, prohibits the dumping at sea of offshore installations with limited exceptions. It requires that most decommissioned platforms, pipelines, and subsea structures be removed to shore for treatment, re-use, or recycling.

The North Sea decommissioning programme is one of the largest industrial decommissioning projects in the world. The NSTA (North Sea Transition Authority) estimates that more than 500 installations will be decommissioned in the North Sea by 2040, at a total estimated cost of GBP 20 billion. The onshore receiving sites – at Dales Voe in Shetland, the Tees Valley industrial zone, and sites in Western Norway and the Netherlands – are active industrial facilities for the duration of operations, handling large quantities of high-value steel alongside residual hydrocarbons and occasionally low-activity radioactive scale (NORM – naturally occurring radioactive material).

Security at onshore decommissioning receiving sites must manage the standard challenges of an active industrial site – access management, vehicle control, equipment security – as well as the specific risks of a facility handling decommissioning waste: NORM management (Environment Agency authorisation required for disposal), potential residual hydrocarbon releases, and high-value steel components that attract organised theft operations.

Scrap Metal Theft and Organised Plant Theft

The organised plant and equipment theft sector operates at a level of sophistication that surprises many facilities managers. Groups operating in the UK and across Western Europe use heavy plant equipment for rapid removal, fabricated documentation for road transport, and pre-arranged buyers at scrap processing facilities that do not consistently verify the provenance of incoming material.

A decommissioning site in the period between production cessation and full site clearance is an attractive target. The equipment inventory is known – in the case of a North Sea platform, the structural weight and composition is publicly available in decommissioning programme documentation submitted to the NSTA. The security presence has reduced from operational levels. And the timeline for physical clearance provides a window in which the risk-reward calculation favours a well-organised operation.

Effective countermeasures combine perimeter integrity (continuous fencing, regular inspection, lighting), documented equipment inventory with photographic records at disposal staging areas, and a security patrol function specifically timed to cover the highest-risk periods – typically overnight and at weekend transitions when permanent staff are absent.

The Chernobyl Exclusion Zone and Post-Soviet Radiological Security

Beyond the North Sea and UK, some of the most significant decommissioning security challenges are associated with post-Soviet industrial infrastructure. The Ukrainian State Agency for Management of the Exclusion Zone (DAZV) has documented persistent incidents of unauthorised entry into the 30km Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, including the removal of metal components with residual radioactive contamination from the abandoned Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant buildings and the nearby ghost town of Pripyat.

The IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), which tracks incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material outside regulatory control, records hundreds of confirmed incidents annually. A significant proportion involves orphaned radioactive sources – sealed sources from industrial gauges, medical equipment, and other applications – that were abandoned at decommissioning sites in former Soviet states without adequate security provisions.

Russia’s Rosatom manages a large portfolio of Soviet-era nuclear sites at various stages of decommissioning. IAEA peer review reports have noted inconsistency in physical protection standards across this portfolio, particularly at smaller sites where regulatory oversight is less intensive than at major facilities. Security professionals advising on work in this environment should treat radiological material security as a primary risk consideration.

Close Protection for Decommissioning Project Personnel

Decommissioning operations are often located far from major urban centres. A North Sea receiving facility in Shetland, a former mining operation in Kazakhstan, an oil platform decommissioning project in West Africa – all share the characteristic of remote or peri-urban location with limited law enforcement response capacity.

Senior project managers, contract engineers, and executives overseeing these operations in high-risk markets face a kidnap-for-ransom risk profile that differs from the urban executive environment. The remoteness extends response times. The workforce is transient and not well-known to local security authorities. And the commercial value of a senior decommissioning project manager as a ransom target is recognised in several West African and Central Asian markets where threat actors have specifically targeted oil and gas sector personnel.

Close protection for decommissioning sector personnel requires an officer with industrial site experience – familiarity with access management protocols, emergency muster procedures, and coordination with site safety teams – alongside the personal security capabilities standard in close protection. Generic executive protection without industrial context is insufficient for this environment.

The security architecture considerations that apply during the construction phase of industrial projects – covered in detail in security for construction and infrastructure projects – apply equally and with additional complexity during decommissioning, given the changing workforce composition and the reduced operational security infrastructure. And the specific radiological and nuclear security considerations overlap with those addressed in security for nuclear energy facilities.

James Whitfield is a Senior Security Consultant with experience in critical infrastructure protection, close protection operations, and industrial site security planning. Enquiries: use the contact form.

Summary

Key takeaways

Decommissioning Creates a Security Gap Between Operation and Clearance

The period between production cessation and physical site clearance is the highest-risk window for equipment theft and unauthorised entry. Workforce reduction is rapid. Security presence diminishes. High-value plant items remain on site. Organisations that maintain active-phase security standards until full clearance, rather than scaling back immediately after production stops, significantly reduce losses in this window.

ONR Security Requirements Continue Throughout UK Nuclear Decommissioning

The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 apply throughout the decommissioning lifecycle. Sites holding nuclear material in any form must maintain an approved security plan regardless of whether the reactor is operating. Security resource planning for nuclear decommissioning projects should not treat security as a cost to reduce as production capacity declines.

Radioactive Material Theft Is an Active Problem in Post-Soviet and Conflict-Affected Markets

IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) reports document hundreds of incidents annually involving the theft or loss of radioactive sources globally. Many originate from industrial decommissioning contexts in former Soviet states, where orphaned sources from abandoned industrial sites remain inadequately secured. Decommissioning project managers operating in these environments require security plans that specifically address radiological material integrity.

Copper and Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Drives Organised Plant Theft at Decommissioning Sites

Organised plant and equipment theft groups -- operating with heavy equipment, fabricated documentation, and organised logistics -- specifically target decommissioning sites. The value of copper cable, aluminium structures, stainless steel vessels, and instrumentation on a typical North Sea-era onshore decommissioning site can run to hundreds of thousands of pounds. Perimeter security, documented equipment inventories, and nighttime patrols significantly reduce this risk.

Senior Decommissioning Personnel in P1 Markets Need Close Protection

Project managers and executives overseeing decommissioning contracts in West Africa, Central Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe face kidnap-for-ransom risk that exceeds the typical corporate executive profile. Decommissioning sites are often in remote locations with limited emergency response capacity. A close protection officer with industrial site experience provides both personal security and operational coordination with site safety teams.

FAQ

Frequently Asked Questions

The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) requires that sites undergoing decommissioning maintain an approved security plan throughout the decommissioning process. The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 (as amended) apply throughout decommissioning, not just during active operation. The plan must address physical protection of any remaining nuclear material, access management for a changing contractor workforce, and the secure handling and transport of radioactive waste at every stage of removal.

OSPAR Decision 98/3 prohibits dumping and leaving in place of offshore installations in the North East Atlantic, with limited exceptions. It requires most North Sea platforms to be brought ashore for decommissioning. The onshore receiving facilities – in Scotland, the Tees Valley, and Western Norway – are active industrial sites during operations, with access management, equipment security, and hazardous material handling requirements that persist throughout a typically multi-year decommissioning process.

Once a site moves from active operation to decommissioning, the workforce contracts sharply and the perceived security presence diminishes. This creates a window in which high-value industrial equipment – specialist machinery, copper and non-ferrous metals, stainless steel vessels, instrumentation – is present on site but the security overhead associated with active production has been reduced or removed. Organised plant and equipment theft groups specifically target decommissioning sites in the period between production cessation and physical demolition.

The Chernobyl Exclusion Zone in Ukraine has experienced persistent incidents of unauthorised entry and removal of radioactive material for scrap metal value. The Ukrainian State Agency for Management of the Exclusion Zone (DAZV) has documented multiple such incidents. Russia’s Rosatom manages a large portfolio of Soviet-era nuclear sites at various stages of decommissioning, and IAEA peer review reports have noted inconsistency in physical protection standards across this portfolio, particularly at smaller inactive sites.

Yes. Senior project managers, contract engineers, and executives overseeing decommissioning operations in high-risk markets – particularly in Russia, Kazakhstan, and parts of West Africa where oil and gas infrastructure is being decommissioned – face kidnap-for-ransom risk that is higher than the typical urban executive. Decommissioning sites are often in remote or peri-urban locations with limited law enforcement response. A close protection officer with industrial site experience provides both personal security and coordination with on-site safety teams.

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