Security Intelligence

Close Protection in South Asia: Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka | CloseProtectionHire

Q: "What is the security environment for business travel to Bangladesh in 2026?"

"Bangladesh has experienced significant political volatility. The August 2024 student-led uprising resulted in the fall of Sheikh Hasina's Awami League government after 15 years in power, following which Muhammad Yunus was appointed as head of an interim government. The political transition has produced a changed but still uncertain security environment. FCDO advises heightened awareness across Bangladesh and advises against all but essential travel to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) due to civil unrest and crime. In Dhaka, the specific risks for corporate visitors are: political protest and civil unrest (the post-uprising period has not fully stabilised), crime targeting foreign nationals (petty theft, vehicle crime, and limited but documented KFR risk), and the risk that a specific business relationship has political connectivity to the former or current government that creates a targeting dimension."

Q: "Is Sri Lanka safe for business travel after the 2022 economic crisis?"

"Sri Lanka has moved beyond the acute phase of the 2022 economic and political crisis that saw President Gotabaya Rajapaksa flee the country. The IMF bailout programme (USD 2.9 billion, March 2023) has stabilised the macroeconomic position and foreign exchange reserves. FCDO currently rates Sri Lanka as requiring normal security awareness for most of the island, with elevated awareness in parts of the north and north-east (former conflict zones). For standard corporate visitors, Colombo is generally manageable. The specific residual risks are: petty crime in tourist and commercial areas, occasional politically motivated protests, and, for visitors with business interests connected to politically sensitive sectors (defence, infrastructure, energy), the intelligence and corruption dimensions that have been documented in Sri Lanka's business environment."

Q: "What are the security risks in Nepal for business and expedition visitors?"

"Nepal has a dual risk profile that is rarely found in other countries. Kathmandu is a functioning commercial capital with a generally manageable security environment for corporate visitors. The Nepalese high-altitude regions (Everest base camp, Annapurna circuit, and comparable trekking routes) present a different risk set: altitude sickness and HACE/HAPE (High Altitude Cerebral/Pulmonary Edema), remoteness from medical care, natural hazard risk (the 2015 earthquake killed 8,000+), and some petty crime targeting trekkers. For corporate visitors to Kathmandu, the primary risks are: political instability (Nepal has had over 30 governments since 2006), natural disasters, and standard urban crime. For expedition or adventure business visitors, the altitude medicine baseline applies absolutely."

Q: "Can close protection operators carry firearms in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal?"

"No. Foreign nationals cannot legally carry firearms in any of the three countries within standard assignment timelines. Bangladesh regulates private security under the Private Security Services Act 2009; armed security requires specific government authorisation. Sri Lanka's Department of Manpower and Employment regulates the private security sector; foreign armed operators are not permitted. Nepal's regulation of private security is more limited; armed security is effectively unavailable for commercial assignments. In practice, all three countries are unarmed CP environments for foreign assignments. Close protection in these markets requires partnering with local licensed security companies for any assignment requiring a security presence, and the focus of the programme is on intelligence, planning, and defensive driving rather than armed response."

Q: "What is the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) threat relevant to Bangladesh and regional planning?"

"AQIS (al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) was established in 2014 and has been responsible for attacks in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. In Bangladesh, AQIS and the domestic Ansar al-Islam group claimed responsibility for attacks targeting secular bloggers, academics, foreign nationals, and LGBT activists between 2013 and 2016 -- a period that saw over 40 targeted machete and knife attacks. The attack pattern has reduced significantly since 2016 following Bangladeshi security force operations. However, the underlying extremist environment that produced the attacks has not been eliminated. Foreign nationals in Bangladesh who have high public profiles, are involved in activities that could be characterised as anti-Islamic or politically contentious, or who are associated with organisations that have been targeted historically, carry a residual risk that warrants threat assessment before deployment."

Close protection across South Asia beyond the P1 cities: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Threat environments, political volatility, regulatory frameworks, and operational planning for CP assignments.

4 May 2026

Written by James Whitfield

Speak to the Team

South Asia beyond the P1 city group – Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal – presents a security landscape that is frequently underestimated by corporate travellers who treat the region as less complex than Southeast Asia or the Gulf. Each country has specific risks, distinct political dynamics, and a regulatory framework for close protection that requires individual assessment.

This guide covers the current threat environment in each country, the security considerations for P2 visits and corporate assignments, the regulatory framework for close protection, and the regional planning context that applies to all three countries.

Bangladesh: Post-Uprising Transition

Bangladesh entered a new political era in August 2024. The fall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government – which had been in power since 2009 – following a student-led protest movement that began over civil service quota reforms and rapidly became a broader democratic uprising, produced a political transition whose full security implications are still evolving.

Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel Prize-winning microfinance founder, was appointed head of an interim government in August 2024. The political environment in Bangladesh through 2025 and into 2026 has been characterised by: ongoing political activity from the major parties, factional violence between Awami League supporters and the political movements that emerged from the uprising, economic uncertainty following the political transition, and the security implications of the transition for specific business interests.

Dhaka: The capital is the commercial and political centre. The specific risks for corporate visitors are: political protest and periodic civil unrest (the post-uprising political environment remains unsettled), petty crime targeting foreign nationals (vehicle crime, theft in commercial areas), and the risk that a specific business relationship has political connectivity – to either the former or current government – that creates a targeting dimension. The FCDO advises heightened awareness in Bangladesh generally.

Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT): FCDO advises against all but essential travel to the CHT (Rangamati, Khagrachhari, and Bandarban districts) due to civil unrest and crime. The CHT has a history of ethnic and political conflict between Bengali settlers and indigenous communities. Operations in the CHT require specific authorisation from Bangladeshi authorities and a security plan appropriate to a remote area with limited emergency services.

Extremist threat: The targeted attack campaign against secular figures, foreign nationals, and minority groups between 2013 and 2016 (attributed to Ansar al-Islam and AQIS) has reduced significantly following Bangladeshi security force operations. The underlying extremist environment has not been fully neutralised. Foreign nationals with high public profiles or associations with activities that could be characterised as politically or religiously contentious should maintain profile awareness.

Sri Lanka: Post-Crisis Stabilisation

Sri Lanka has moved past the acute phase of the 2022 crisis – when severe foreign exchange shortages produced fuel and medicine shortages, mass protests, and the storming of the Presidential residence. The IMF Extended Fund Facility agreement (USD 2.9 billion, approved March 2023) stabilised the macroeconomic position. GDP growth returned to positive territory in 2024 (IMF: 4.5% growth, 2024 projection). President Ranil Wickremesinghe, who managed the IMF programme, was succeeded by Anura Kumara Dissanayake in the September 2024 presidential election.

Colombo: The commercial capital has largely returned to a normal operating environment for corporate visitors. The specific risk factors are: occasional politically motivated protests, petty crime in tourist and commercial areas, and for visitors with interests in politically sensitive sectors (infrastructure, energy, defence supply chain), the corruption and intelligence dimensions that have been documented in Sri Lanka’s business environment.

Northern and North-Eastern Sri Lanka: The 26-year civil war (1983-2009) produced significant UXO contamination in former battlefield areas. HALO Trust operations have cleared large areas, but residual hazardous zones remain documented. Medical infrastructure in the north and north-east is significantly less developed than in Colombo. Operations requiring access to former conflict zone areas need a current UXO assessment and specific medical evacuation planning.

Easter Sunday legacy: The April 2019 coordinated bombing attacks (269 killed at churches and hotels) reshaped Sri Lanka’s security posture for international visitors significantly. Security at Colombo international hotels is now substantially higher than pre-2019 levels. Visitors should treat hotel and venue security checks as a genuine protective measure, not an inconvenience.

Nepal: Dual Risk Profiles

Nepal is unusual in presenting two entirely separate security planning challenges within a single country:

Kathmandu valley: The capital and commercial hub has a generally manageable security environment for corporate visitors. Nepal is one of the more politically stable countries in South Asia by headline metrics, though it has had over 30 governments since 2006 – the political system is fragmented and coalition governments rarely complete full terms. The practical security risks in Kathmandu are: standard urban crime (petty theft, vehicle crime), natural disaster risk (the April 2015 earthquake killed approximately 8,000 people and destroyed significant infrastructure – Nepal sits on an active seismic fault), and the occasional political protest that generates disruption.

High-altitude regions: Trekking and expedition access above 3,000 metres creates a risk profile that has no equivalent in standard corporate travel. The relevant risks are:

Altitude illness: High Altitude Cerebral Edema (HACE) and High Altitude Pulmonary Edema (HAPE) are potentially fatal conditions that can develop rapidly at altitude. The Wilderness Medical Society protocol (updated 2019) and Himalayan Rescue Association (HRA) guidelines are the baseline clinical references. Acclimatisation protocols, the “climb high, sleep low” principle, and immediate descent on symptom development are absolute requirements.

MEDEVAC from altitude: Helicopter evacuation from Everest base camp or the Annapurna circuit is expensive (approximately USD 2,000-6,000 per flight depending on altitude and conditions), weather-dependent, and requires pre-arranged cover. Global Rescue, International SOS, and Himalayan Rescue Association provide the principal MEDEVAC services in Nepal. Coverage must be arranged before departure – no operator can be engaged during a rescue without prior arrangement.

Natural hazard: The 2015 earthquake, the 2023 Mustang earthquake (18 killed), and ongoing seismic activity mean that natural disaster preparedness is a planning requirement for any Nepal deployment. A current seismic risk assessment and a communications protocol for contact with base camp or Kathmandu during a natural disaster event should be part of the deployment plan.

Regional Context

India-Pakistan bilateral dimension: Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka each have their own relationship with the India-Pakistan dynamic that shapes their security environment. Bangladesh’s security is directly affected by its relationship with India – the Teesta water sharing dispute, the border management relationship, and the political complexity of the post-August 2024 transition and India’s reaction to the fall of Hasina (who maintained close India-Bangladesh ties). An escalation in India-Pakistan tensions historically produces security tightening and economic disruption in all three countries. Regional threat assessment for South Asia assignments should include a monitoring flag for India-Pakistan relations.

SAARC regional dynamics: The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) provides the institutional framework for regional engagement. For corporate visitors, the most relevant implication is that regional security incidents – particularly those with cross-border dimensions – can produce rapid changes in the operating environment across multiple South Asian countries simultaneously.

For the close protection environments in the P1 South Asian cities, see our Mumbai security guide and Karachi security guide. For the close protection operating environment across Southeast Asia, see our close protection in Southeast Asia guide.

Sources

FCDO: Travel Advice Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal – April 2026. US State Department: Travel Advisory Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal – 2025. OSAC: Bangladesh Country Security Report 2024. OSAC: Sri Lanka Country Security Report 2024. OSAC: Nepal Country Security Report 2024. Control Risks RiskMap 2025. IMF: Sri Lanka Extended Fund Facility 2023 and Progress Report 2024. HALO Trust: Sri Lanka Land Release Report 2024. Himalayan Rescue Association: Altitude Medicine Guidelines 2024. Wilderness Medical Society: High Altitude Illness Guidelines 2019. ACLED: South Asia Political Violence Dataset 2025-2026. Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2025 – Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal. HRW: World Report 2025 – South Asia chapter. CPJ: Journalist Safety – South Asia 2024.

James Whitfield is a Senior Security Consultant with 20 years of experience in close protection and security risk management across South and Southeast Asia.

Summary

Key takeaways

Bangladesh's post-August 2024 political transition creates a new but incompletely understood threat environment

The fall of the Awami League government in August 2024 and the establishment of the interim government under Muhammad Yunus has changed the political landscape in ways whose full security implications are still emerging. Business visitors with interests connected to the former government's business network, or to the industries and relationships that defined the Hasina era, face a changed risk context that requires a current assessment, not a pre-2024 baseline.

Sri Lanka's civil war geography still shapes the security profile of the north and north-east

The 26-year civil war ended in 2009 but the former conflict zone in the north and north-east carries residual risk including UXO, limited medical infrastructure, and community tensions that are not fully resolved. Business or heritage visitors to these regions require a specific risk assessment that goes beyond the general Sri Lanka country rating.

Nepal has two distinct risk profiles that require separate planning frameworks

Kathmandu business travel and high-altitude expedition access to Nepal are not the same security planning problem. The altitude medicine baseline -- including HACE/HAPE awareness, acclimatisation protocols, and MEDEVAC cover from Himalayan Rescue Association or Global Rescue -- is non-negotiable for any visitor going above 3,000 metres.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh and the northern highlands of Sri Lanka require specific operational planning

Both areas have FCDO advisories reflecting active or residual security concerns. Operations in these areas cannot be treated as standard business travel with enhanced awareness. They require dedicated threat assessment, local partner vetting, and communications protocols appropriate to areas with limited emergency services infrastructure.

Regional awareness of the India-Pakistan tension dimension is required for South Asia assignments

The India-Pakistan bilateral dynamic -- including nuclear posture, the Kashmir dispute, and the potential for rapid military escalation -- creates a regional security context that is relevant to any South Asia assignment. An escalation in the India-Pakistan relationship has historically produced internal security tightening in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The regional dimension should be part of the threat assessment for any South Asia assignment.

FAQ

Frequently Asked Questions

Bangladesh has experienced significant political volatility. The August 2024 student-led uprising resulted in the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government after 15 years in power, following which Muhammad Yunus was appointed as head of an interim government. The political transition has produced a changed but still uncertain security environment. FCDO advises heightened awareness across Bangladesh and advises against all but essential travel to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) due to civil unrest and crime. In Dhaka, the specific risks for corporate visitors are: political protest and civil unrest (the post-uprising period has not fully stabilised), crime targeting foreign nationals (petty theft, vehicle crime, and limited but documented KFR risk), and the risk that a specific business relationship has political connectivity to the former or current government that creates a targeting dimension.

Sri Lanka has moved beyond the acute phase of the 2022 economic and political crisis that saw President Gotabaya Rajapaksa flee the country. The IMF bailout programme (USD 2.9 billion, March 2023) has stabilised the macroeconomic position and foreign exchange reserves. FCDO currently rates Sri Lanka as requiring normal security awareness for most of the island, with elevated awareness in parts of the north and north-east (former conflict zones). For standard corporate visitors, Colombo is generally manageable. The specific residual risks are: petty crime in tourist and commercial areas, occasional politically motivated protests, and, for visitors with business interests connected to politically sensitive sectors (defence, infrastructure, energy), the intelligence and corruption dimensions that have been documented in Sri Lanka’s business environment.

Nepal has a dual risk profile that is rarely found in other countries. Kathmandu is a functioning commercial capital with a generally manageable security environment for corporate visitors. The Nepalese high-altitude regions (Everest base camp, Annapurna circuit, and comparable trekking routes) present a different risk set: altitude sickness and HACE/HAPE (High Altitude Cerebral/Pulmonary Edema), remoteness from medical care, natural hazard risk (the 2015 earthquake killed 8,000+), and some petty crime targeting trekkers. For corporate visitors to Kathmandu, the primary risks are: political instability (Nepal has had over 30 governments since 2006), natural disasters, and standard urban crime. For expedition or adventure business visitors, the altitude medicine baseline applies absolutely.

No. Foreign nationals cannot legally carry firearms in any of the three countries within standard assignment timelines. Bangladesh regulates private security under the Private Security Services Act 2009; armed security requires specific government authorisation. Sri Lanka’s Department of Manpower and Employment regulates the private security sector; foreign armed operators are not permitted. Nepal’s regulation of private security is more limited; armed security is effectively unavailable for commercial assignments. In practice, all three countries are unarmed CP environments for foreign assignments. Close protection in these markets requires partnering with local licensed security companies for any assignment requiring a security presence, and the focus of the programme is on intelligence, planning, and defensive driving rather than armed response.

AQIS (al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) was established in 2014 and has been responsible for attacks in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. In Bangladesh, AQIS and the domestic Ansar al-Islam group claimed responsibility for attacks targeting secular bloggers, academics, foreign nationals, and LGBT activists between 2013 and 2016 – a period that saw over 40 targeted machete and knife attacks. The attack pattern has reduced significantly since 2016 following Bangladeshi security force operations. However, the underlying extremist environment that produced the attacks has not been eliminated. Foreign nationals in Bangladesh who have high public profiles, are involved in activities that could be characterised as anti-Islamic or politically contentious, or who are associated with organisations that have been targeted historically, carry a residual risk that warrants threat assessment before deployment.

Get in Touch

Request a Consultation

Describe your security requirements below. All enquiries are confidential and handled by licensed consultants.